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Recognising Social Work: The influence of the politics of recognition on social 
work
Author: Kenneth McLaughlin
Abstract
The politics of recognition is a common framework through which both individual 
and group demands are made today. Demands are made not only for individual 
distress to be validated, but also for cultural identities to be accorded positive 
recognition; in the acknowledgement of past trauma or abuse in the former, and 
in showing respect towards different lifestyles and beliefs in the latter. This paper 
discusses the politics of recognition in its historical specificity, in particular its 
interaction with the new social movements that came to the fore in the latter 
decades of the twentieth century. Such movements increasingly focused on 
cultural issues with a concomitant decline of a more materialist politics that 
emphasised economic redistribution. The forms that such demands for 
recognition can take are also highlighted. In addition, some implications for social 
policy and social work are discussed as whilst welfare recipients are often people 
requiring recognition, increasingly welfare providers also articulate a desire for 
their professionalism and societal worth to also be accorded positive cultural 
recognition. In light of this, barriers to, and strategies for, the achievement of a 
form of ‘mutual recognition’ between professionals and social workers are also 
discussed.
Keywords: Politics; Society; Identity; Validation
2
Introduction
The politics of recognition is arguably a key theoretical framework within which 
many contemporary social problems and related struggles are understood today 
(Fraser, 2008). It is frequently the language of recognition within which many of 
the ‘new social movements’ articulate their problems and identify the means to 
redress them. It forms the basis of much identity politics, whereby certain 
aspects of identity such as ethnicity, gender, sexuality or disability are 
recognised as valid in their own terms, and not as a deviation from some 
(traditionally white, male, heterosexual and able-bodied) western normative 
order.
Developed in relation to these wider social and political issues, the theoretical 
development of the politics of recognition attempts to understand the socio-
political struggles of the late twentieth century onwards.  There have been 
increasing attempts to engage with these theoretical debates within social 
welfare and social work (e.g. Houston, 2008; Webb, 2010), something that should 
come as no surprise given that the cultural turn in contemporary politics 
influenced both social policy and social work practice, for example in the 
recognition of cultural difference and the affirmation of personal experience.
In this paper I do not wish to discuss these important theoretical insights in great 
detail. I have done this elsewhere (McLaughlin, 2012) and would also refer any 
reader wishing an in depth discussion of the theoretical complexities of the 
recognition debate to the work of Lois McNay (2008), and the debates between 
Nancy Fraser and a variety of her critics including Axel Honneth, Judith Butler and 
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Richard Rorty (Fraser, 2008). For discussions of these ideas in in relation to social 
welfare see Martin (2001) and Dahl (2009), and in relation to social work see 
Garrett (2010), Houston (2010) and Webb (2010).
My intention here is to provide a brief overview of the theories and to provide 
some examples of their complexity and conditions of emergence, and also to 
highlight changes in the way that many social movements articulate and express 
both hurt and protest. In this respect the focus is not merely on the rise to 
prominence of the ‘demand for recognition’ but rather to clarify what it is that is 
to be so recognised; what are the specific aspects of identity and culture that are 
presented as requiring public affirmation today? In so doing, I wish to 
contextualise both identity and expressions of recognition as historically specific 
constructs for the articulation of political and personal distress. These 
developments are important for social workers in their interaction with 
individuals and groups who are seeking recognition, but they are also relevant to 
social work as it to, partly in the wake of adverse media coverage, seeks public 
and professional recognition.
Redistribution or recognition
That we, as humans, require recognition from others is not a new psychological 
or philosophical insight. The German philosopher Hegel (1770-1831) argued that 
it was the ‘struggle for recognition’ that led to self-awareness. Nevertheless, 
Hegel’s central thesis of recognition from our fellow humans as being essential to 
achieve full humanity received a resurgence of academic and wider political 
interest in the latter decades of the twentieth century. According to Taylor (1994) 
recognition from our fellow humans is not a matter of common courtesy, ‘it is a 
vital human need’. If this is the case, if due recognition is an essential part of 
what makes us fully human, then it follows that the withholding of it, or 
4
misrecognition, ‘shows not just a lack of due respect. It can inflict a grievous 
wound, saddling its victims with a crippling self-hatred’ (p.26). Whilst Garrett 
(2010) is correct to identify the 1990s as the period in which academics re-
engaged with theories of recognition, in reality such presuppositions had been 
the concern of both sides of the left/right political divide in the 1980s. The rise of 
multiculturalism and identity politics in this period indicates that in this respect 
the academy was analysing contemporary developments by use of theoretical 
concepts that were already in political usage, albeit articulated in non-academic 
terminology. In other words, the academy followed, it did not lead, the 
contemporary return to Hegel. This should come as no surprise, critical theory is, 
at its best, the ‘theoretical reflection of the emancipatory movements of the age’ 
(Honneth, 2003, p.112 ). 
Concern has been raised that according primacy to matters of cultural 
recognition risks downplaying the material inequalities that exist within modern 
society. In other words, a politics of cultural recognition can displace one that 
concerns itself with material redistribution.  The debate between Nancy Fraser 
and Judith Butler illustrates the complexities of the issue. Fraser (2008) is aware 
of, and concerned by, the danger of polarising the debate, and with it political 
tactics, by positing it as an either/or issue: a class based politics of redistribution 
versus a cultural politics of recognition of difference. For Fraser,  this either/or 
dichotomy is problematic because in reality both are necessary for true social 
justice;  not only is cultural or group recognition required but economic and 
material redistribution also  if ‘participatory parity’ is to be achieved. For 
example, being white, male and heterosexual may, in cultural terms, make you 
part of the normative cultural order, but if you have little money or material 
possessions your ability to participate in society is severely curtailed. In this 
instance it is economic and material redistribution, not cultural recognition that is 
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required. On the other hand, as homosexuals occupy all spheres of social and 
economic life their collective identity is not based on their relationship to the 
means of production but in their position as a devalued group. Their 
marginalisation as homosexuals is not rooted in the economic sphere; rather it is 
in the cultural domain where heterosexist norms and homophobic attitudes 
reside. From this, it follows that cultural recognition, not economic redistribution 
is necessary to address this aspect of injustice
Such a polarisation however is problematic, not only because of the 
intersectionality of such aspects of identity as race, sexuality and class. For 
example, the argument that certain sexualities are devalued predominantly due 
to cultural misrecognition has been criticised for viewing issues around sexuality 
as being ‘merely cultural’ (Butler, 2008). Butler argues that Fraser’s downgrading 
of queer politics in this way is due to an analysis that overlooks the way in which, 
in a capitalist economy, the regulation of sexuality, with its gendered 
heterosexist assumptions was systematically connected to the mode of 
economic production in such a way that both ‘gender’ and ‘sexuality’ become 
part of material life. This is ‘not only because of the way in which it serves the 
sexual division of labor, but also because normative gender serves the 
reproduction of the normative family’ (Butler, 2008, p.51). Honneth (2003) also 
sees the separation of redistribution and recognition as running the risk of 
‘introducing a theoretically unbridgeable chasm between “symbolic” and 
“material” aspects of social reality’ (p.113). Honneth does not deny the need for 
economic redistribution but he sees it as being just another aspect of required 
recognition. 
It can be seen, even from this very brief discussion, that the 
redistribution/recognition issue is a complex one. Further problems can arise in 
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that cultural identities, which are fluid, complex and intersectional can be reified 
if one aspect of them is selected for ‘recognition’. 
The above has relevance to social workers in that they need to take into account 
all the factors that are pertinent to a person’s sense of identity, especially 
barriers to them being seen as fully human subjects, if they are to help them 
achieve social justice. It highlights the danger of hiding behind the cloak of ‘anti-
oppressive’ practice, where cultural difference is recognised but there is a failure 
to address economic inequality, for example in the denial of adequate assistance 
to asylum seekers (Humphries, 2004).
New Social Movements
The politics of recognition forms the basis of the theoretical and political work of 
what have been termed New Social Movements (NSMs). Such movements came 
to prominence in the 1960s and gained momentum during the 1970s and 1980s. 
Whilst many of these movements still emphasised the importance of social class 
and economic inequality, class was demoted from its hitherto exalted status as 
the main vehicle of progressive social and political change. Other forms of 
identity, such as race, gender, sexuality and disability challenged the centrality 
of class based paradigms, pointing out that this either marginalised their 
experiences and/or further contributed to their oppression.  The emergence of 
NSMs marked a move away from a focus on disputes between capital and labour 
to campaigns that focused less on monetary demands and more on cultural and 
lifestyle issues. In challenging the normative order, movements such as 
environmentalism, feminism, and lesbian and gay groups promoted alternative 
ways of living and embraced differing values to the norm.
The main friction within society then was not necessarily class-based but due to 
the tension where system and lifeworld conflict. For Habermas (1981) 
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contemporary disputes arose from ‘the colonization of the life-world’, and ‘are 
not sparked by problems of distribution, but concern the grammar of forms of 
life’ (p.33, emphasis in original). There has been much debate about whether 
Habermas is correct in his analysis of the extent of the decline of class conflict. 
For example, Edwards (2004) highlights sporadic outbreaks of 
employer/employee conflict over pay and working conditions in an attempt to 
show that Habermas underestimates the extent of class conflict today, whilst 
Shakespeare (1993) points out that it is not an either/or situation, and that many 
‘new’ movements also campaign around ‘old’ issues such as material 
redistribution. Such empirically focused debates tend to miss what is of most 
historical importance within social movement theory and practice. As Crossley 
(2002) points out, it is the paradigm shift in how the working class is viewed, and 
also views itself, that is of historical importance. For the old labour based 
movements the working class was the main social movement in capitalist 
society. For the NSMs it is but one identity that should not be accorded any 
special status. NSMs then analyse society to identify 
other schisms, conflicts and movements at the heart of the modern social  
order… The thesis of NSMs, in this respect, is a thesis about the shift in the 
mode of historicity in western societies and the corresponding shift in the 
central struggle of those societies. It is this mode of historicity and its 
faultlines which lends NSMs their ‘newness’, rather than any particular 
empirical feature of those movements.
 (Crossley, 2002, p.151, emphasis in original)
This is not to suggest the absence of aspects of cultural and lifestyle issues 
within the older class focused social movements, but rather to emphasise their 
move from the periphery to the centre of social movement theory and political 
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struggle. The focus was now predominantly on cultural recognition not 
necessarily economic redistribution. However, if a desire for recognition is a vital 
human need its manifestation is also a historically specific one. The formation of 
the self and what aspects of it that is emphasised and valued is not universal or 
timeless; on the contrary it is influenced by the intersection of various social 
dynamics. In this respect it is worth looking at some contemporary demands for 
recognition and some of the factors that led to them being articulated in such a 
way.
Recognising What?
There has been much discussion about the merits of the politics of recognition in 
relation to various social movements and groupings, and the processes that have 
influenced the wider publicity given to certain aspects of life experience and 
identity formation. Many factors intersect to influence how people give meaning 
to their lives and articulate their problems, with the interplay of power and 
politics important as campaigners frequently try to get their concerns higher up 
the political agenda, often, as in the case of feminism, trying to get what were 
hitherto seen as private concerns (such as domestic violence, child abuse and 
unpaid household labour) recognised as political issues. However, the reasons 
why some campaigns are more successful than others can be complex, and for 
all the positives in highlighting the existence of abuse the current pre-occupation 
with it also illustrates the priority given to recognition (in this case of past abuse 
and/or current trauma) over more material concerns in. In other words, as some 
avenues are closed off others come to prominence. 
Such a political process can be seen in relation to the rising focus on child sexual 
abuse and concomitant declining emphasis on poverty (Haaken, 1998). Haaken 
notes how the decline of an activist women’s movement during the 1980s and 
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the rise of neo-liberal conservatism had a detrimental effect on many grassroots 
women’s organisations. However, whilst those programmes that campaigned 
around such issues as poverty and domestic abuse declined in number, those 
organisations that focused on child sexual abuse survived. For Haaken, this was 
because ‘sexuality was the one area where feminists could enlist conservative 
support and moral outrage’ (p.241). Likewise, the focus on the catholic church as 
an entity within which there was widespread child sexual abuse was also 
influenced by it being easier for feminist campaigners to generate support and 
sympathy over clerical sexual abuse of a minor than it was to generate unity of 
moral outrage over the church’s pronouncements on such things as 
homosexuality, abortion or women’s position within patriarchal society. This 
draws attention to the way that the current focus on sexual abuse and 
concomitant demand by victims to have their suffering recognised is as much to 
do with external politics as it is with internal cognitive drives. This is not to deny 
the reality of abuse it is merely to historicise its articulation.
In similar vein, the attempt to give meaning to experience via the paradigm of 
trauma is itself a historically specific development, and again one in which 
politics and social movements played a key role. Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD) first appeared in the third edition of the American Psychiatric 
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-III) in 1980. However, as 
with many psychiatric diagnoses, its inclusion was less to do with developments 
within psychiatry than with those in the wider world of politics, in this case the 
anti-Vietnam war fervour prevalent within US society at the time. As Scott (1990) 
notes,
The struggle for recognition of PTSD by its champions was profoundly 
political, and displays the full range of negotiation, coalition formation, 
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strategising, solidarity affirmation, and struggle – both inside various 
professions and ‘in the streets – that define the term. 
(p.925)
In effect, despite the validity of PTSD being disputed within the psychiatric 
establishment, those in favour of its inclusion in DSM-III ‘were better organised, 
more politically motivated, active and ultimately successful’ (McLaughlin, 2012, 
p.60). Seen from such a perspective, the demand for recognition of PTSD, whilst 
it may be experienced individually in the contemporary period, is not the 
outward expression of an internal, unmediated psychological drive, but is a 
historically contingent form of seeking validation of, and giving meaning to, 
experience. Since being first included in the DSM-III, the concept of trauma has 
expanded from its initial focus on those who had suffered extreme experiences 
to become an increasingly common way of articulating distress. Such is the 
plasticity of the term that it can be utilised by opposing groups. For example, in 
relation to abortion, many pro-choice activists argue that to give birth to an 
unwanted child, especially if the pregnancy was the result of rape, would be 
harmful to the woman’s mental health. Similar arguments are also heard from 
pro-life activists who argue that future trauma awaits the woman who has an 
abortion, with some at the extreme end of the spectrum arguing that even in the 
case of abortion following incest or rape ‘abortion is equally destructive. Women 
report that they are suffering from the trauma of abortion long after the rape 
trauma has faded’. From this perspective the abortion is seen as ‘the second 
rape’ (Feminists for Life, 2008, online).
 The demand for recognition then, frequently takes the form of recognising past 
or current suffering, the traumatised self being presented for public affirmation. 
Recognising service users
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The usefulness of the recognition thesis to social work has been well 
documented in relation to work with service users, in particular its connection 
with attachment theory in relation to child care and mental ‘illness’. The lack of 
‘reciprocal recognition’ from mother or other love object in the early months and 
years of childhood is held to be a key factor in the development of psychological 
problems for the child, problems that can also impact on them when they are 
adults (Garrett, 2009).
In a period in which status differentials are increasingly held to be illegitimate, 
when the rhetoric (if not the reality) emphasises  participatory parity, a variety of 
groups highlight the way in which their particular circumstances situate them 
negatively in relation to other groups. This is most well known with regard to 
issues around race, gender, sexuality and disability, but it also manifests itself in 
other ways. An example of this can be seen in the campaign by Carers UK to 
have the term ‘carer’ to refer exclusively to unpaid carers (Lloyd, 2006). The aim 
of such a campaign is to get some form of recognition for the work they do with 
friends and/or relatives. It is recognition of their contribution to the social welfare 
of others, a recognition that forces professional care workers to acknowledge 
that they are not the only ones doing the caring. Whereas the title of ‘care 
worker’ implies a paid employee, the designation of ‘carer’ signifies an unpaid 
informal caring relationship.
Paradoxically, the struggle for recognition of both the value of care-giving and 
the worth of those who provide it, can lead to the withdrawal of care. Public 
sector strikes would be an example of this, as would be a refusal to carry out 
tasks other than those contractually specified, such as when Danish home helps 
refused to make sandwiches for their elderly clients in an attempt to gain 
recognition for what was seen as silenced, unrecognised, care work (Dahl, 2009). 
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Here, we see a clash between the care workers’ demand for financial gain 
(material redistribution) and their clients’ wishes for cultural recognition, to be 
seen as valid human beings worthy of respect and time rather than being treated 
as a commodity, as a task to be completed and ticked off on a timesheet.  It also 
highlights aspects of Honneth’s argument that material redistribution is a form of 
recognition in that the awarding of higher financial reward can make people feel 
more valued, their contribution to society also accorded greater recognition. 
Whilst such an example may seem somewhat trivial it serves to highlight the 
lived experience of recognition and redistribution at the juncture of care work.
Others are concerned that some people are not categorised as a specific service 
user group. For example, Mullender and Hague (2005) are concerned that 
women suffering domestic violence and abuse are not recognised as a user 
group in their own right. They correctly note that one consequence of this is that 
as other, recognised, user groups demand a ‘voice’ into policy development and 
implementation, women survivors of domestic violence and abuse are effectively 
excluded from this process. As a consequence, those with the direct experience 
of domestic abuse and the problems it creates have little input into how services 
purportedly geared to meet their needs are prioritised and implemented. This is 
unfortunate as the insight from the direct experiences of abused women can 
prove invaluable for both policymakers and professionals in the design and 
implementation of initiatives to alleviate the causes and consequences of 
domestic violence and abuse.
Notwithstanding the various dynamics involved in the increased social and 
governmental concern with domestic violence and abuse mentioned earlier, the 
current priority given to it (in relative terms at least) within contemporary social 
policy can be se seen as a successful case of an issue being moved from the 
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private to the public sphere, from the pre-political to the political. Social 
opprobrium towards the perpetrators of such assaults coincides with increased 
recognition of the damage that can be done to the victims. Preventing the 
physical and emotional consequences that sufferers can endure increases their 
ability for ‘participatory parity’ in familial, social and civic life.
However, the above examples of carers and victims of domestic violence and 
abuse highlight that it is recognition by the state that is demanded in the calls 
for past abuse and current hardship to be validated, with calls for measures that 
will improve the quality of care given or received. The incorporation of women 
within a framework of trauma, and also into state policy and procedures can 
come at a cost. The issue of individual trauma can become the focus of 
government action at the expense of the more social and material factors that 
affect women.  In addition, informal care can be reconfigured as a technical 
relationship which runs the risk of undermining spontaneous relationships 
between friends and family. Nevertheless, it is clear that social workers and care 
providers need to listen to those affected by social problems and who access 
social services. In this respect, recognition of the views and experiences of 
service users is essential. However, the politics of recognition is pertinent to 
social workers in other areas also, not least in the profession’s attempts for it 
also to be accorded due recognition.
Recognising social work
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The role of the now disbanded General Social Care Council1, specifically in 
relation to the regulation and registration of social workers, was precisely to have 
social work recognised and valued as a profession, and social workers as 
professionals. The aim is for social workers to be accorded public recognition for 
their professionalism and for providing a valuable service both to particular 
individuals and society in general. By holding to account those who fail to meet 
the required professional standard of behaviour, the GSCC sought to reassure the 
public that those whom it registers are of high moral behaviour and professional 
aptitude. On the whole, this drive for professional status was greeted 
enthusiastically by social workers (McLaughlin, 2008). However, it was not 
always thus. When professional status was on the table in the 1970s there was 
much disagreement as to whether this was a good move, with some radicals 
seeing such a move as elitist and one that would further the divide between 
workers and their clientele (Payne, 2002). In this sense, the demand for 
professional recognition as expressed by social workers can, yet again, be seen 
not as an ahistorical psychological need, but as a historically specific one.
The struggle for recognition of the value of social work was recently fought out in 
the mainstream media. Following the death of Baby Peter Connolly in 2007 at the 
hands of his mother, her boyfriend and his brother, and reports which damned 
social services (alongside other agencies, though this was relatively overlooked) 
for failing on numerous occasions to take steps to protect Baby Peter, social 
workers were pilloried in the tabloid press. Whilst public and media hostility to 
social workers is not new, the Baby Peter case did attract an unprecedented level 
of vitriol, particularly from the Sun newspaper, which published the names and 
1 The GSCC was disbanded on July 31 2012 and the regulation of social work 
became the responsibility of the Health and Care Professions Council on August 
1st 2012.
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photographs of those professionals it deemed responsible for failing to protect 
the child. It also launched a campaign to get them sacked, and also requested 
that anyone with any information about them contact the paper with the details – 
no doubt in the hope of receiving damning and/or salacious personal stories.
 In response to these attacks, some within the social work profession chose to go 
on the offensive. The Social Work Action Network (SWAN), which describes itself 
as ‘a radical, campaigning organisation of social work and social care 
practitioners, students, service users, carers and academics’ (SWAN, 2010, 
online), published a statement condemning media coverage of the Baby Peter 
case, in particular that of the Sun newspaper. Community Care magazine 
launched a Stand Up Now for Social Work campaign, with the specific aim of 
improving media portrayals and public perceptions of the profession (Maier, 
2009). The campaign made seven demands relating to the media and 
employers. The details of the seven demands need not concern us here, what is 
of particular interest in relation to this paper is that the first letter of each 
demand is taken to form the acronym RESPECT. In other words, a particular form 
of recognition is being demanded, recognition of the worth of social work and by 
implication social workers.
Whilst it is of obvious benefit for the social work profession to have highlighted 
the complexities that they deal with on a daily basis and also to showcase the 
beneficial aspects of their interventions for individual service users, their families 
and wider society, such initiatives can have only limited impact on societal 
ambivalence towards social workers. This is due to public attitudes to social 
workers having less to do with malevolent media coverage and more to do with 
the role they play in modern society. So, whilst it is important to accord 
recognition for the important work that social workers do in terms of protecting 
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and helping the vulnerable and those in need, it is equally important not to 
overlook the inherently contentious and problematic nature of the role. Social 
workers invariably negotiate the boundary between the public and private 
spheres, between the right to autonomy from state intrusion into our lives and 
the right of the state, in this instance in the guise of the social worker, to 
exercise authority, control and coercion over how we live our lives. The tension in 
navigating this boundary, and the conflict and hostility it generates, do not arise 
from negative media coverage but from the very nature of the role.  In an 
important sense this is to be welcomed as it benefits both the individual and 
society. It should not be forgotten that access to, and allocation of, scarce 
resources is frequently decided on a social worker’s assessment, as is the 
threshold for compulsory admission to a psychiatric hospital, the instigation of 
court proceedings to remove a child from its parents, or the approval of 
prospective adoptive parents. No matter how appropriate the social worker’s 
decisions in such individual cases may be, we must never lose sight of the fact 
that it is frequently a controversial one with a highly significant outcome for 
those subject to the social worker’s power.
Given the reality of such aspects of the social work role the issue for practitioners 
is to try and work towards a form of practice and interaction with service users 
whereby, hopefully, a form of mutual recognition is achieved.
Towards Mutual Recognition
If both social workers and service users have a shared interest in being accorded 
due recognition, the task for social workers is to incorporate this into their daily 
practice. However, the danger is, particularly in the current climate of austerity 
and cuts to welfare services, that we get a form of recognition more akin to 
Honneth’s conceptualisation with his focus on cultural aspects of identity and the 
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need for tolerance and respect. Whilst this is important we must not forget 
Fraser’s call for such recognition to be coupled with a consideration of the 
material and economic conditions of social work’s clientele. However, 
‘consideration’ in and of itself is not enough, it also requires attempts to improve 
the situation. Failure to do so can lead to the situation, identified as far back as 
the mid-1908s by Sivanandan in relation to ‘race awareness training’ whereby 
(white) professionals gained raised awareness of other (non-white) cultures 
whilst continuing to allocate them the poorest resources, for example housing 
them in the most deprived areas that lacked adequate infrastructure 
(Sivanandan, 1985). 
Of course, an individual social worker can only achieve so much in the face of the 
macroeconomic situation, and the reality of daily practice may entail a restriction 
of service provision as budgets are cut and eligibility thresholds are raised. In 
such a scenario it may be that it is Honneth and not Fraser who offers the most 
appropriate theoretical approach for current practice. However, this would fail to 
address Fraser’s call that both the material and cultural aspects of people’s lives 
be seen as important in pursuit of the goal of participatory parity.
This does not mean making promises to service users that cannot be kept. 
Honesty over what can be done may not be popular and may elicit a hostile 
response but by treating the client with civility, informing them of the reasons 
why such a need cannot be met via social services and offering possible 
alternative providers or advocates it may still be possible to achieve a form of 
mutual recognition. However, this in and of itself is not enough. The social worker 
who is serious about according their clientele due recognition needs to challenge 
the system in which they operate and which is providing inadequate material 
resources to those who are in need of help and support. Such a willingness to 
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challenge the prevailing political and economic climate would not only gain them 
recognition from their clients but would also give them a sense of professional 
integrity. In other words, recognition of the benefits of social work must be 
balanced by a critical appraisal of the role. It would be a sad day for the 
profession if it was to become an uncritical functionary of the state. Nor should 
we accept, or expect those in need of help and support to accept, the low levels 
of resources available. 
The service user led organisation Shaping Our Lives gives some advice for social 
workers on how to work in a person-centred way despite the many constraints 
that they face. Ultimately,
You are in charge of how you personally relate to the people you work with. 
Even if you are not given more time or resources, you can treat people as 
individuals, respect their rights and communicate well. You also have legal 
and moral duties to challenge bad practice in your organisation. You can 
make sure you know about people’s rights, so that you can pass the 
information on and challenge when you see people’s rights being ignored 
and abused.
 (Croft et al., 2011, p.22). 
Working in such a way can be seen as compatible with Fraser’s (2103) linking of 
recognition and redistribution with representation.
The politics of redistribution and recognition have much to offer us as we 
negotiate the social work role. Few reading this would, I hope, contend that the 
vast majority of those who receive social work support require greater material 
resources and less vilification from such sources as government, the media and 
wider society. In short they require both material redistribution and cultural 
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recognition. There will be inevitable tensions as these interact, especially within 
changing economic circumstances and when the demands of some social actors 
conflict with those of others. In many respects, negotiating such tensions is at 
the heart of social work, which is why it is necessary to understand the historical 
and dialectical nature of the articulation of the redistribution/recognition debate. 
This is important not only in an abstract theoretical sense but also in order for 
social workers to help the recipients of social work, because, as Mills (1959) so 
succinctly put, ‘Neither the life of an individual nor the history of a society can be 
understood without understanding both’ (p.3).
Conclusion
In this paper I have sought to show not just the complexity of the turn towards 
cultural recognition in contemporary society but also to highlight some of the 
factors that have allowed it to come to the fore. The decline of class-based 
political movements and with them the loss of faith in the ideologies that they 
espoused was undoubtedly a factor in the rise of the new social movements and 
the cultural turn in political life. The issues raised by such movements proved 
extremely influential in society in general and also in social work education, 
teaching and practice, such issues related to such things as race, gender, 
sexuality and disability being incorporated into the curriculum, policies and 
professional practice respectively. 
It is also clear that the expression of dissent and articulation of experience does 
not happen in a vacuum. In this sense the specific form that demands for 
recognition take are not mere intrapsychic needs but are historically and 
politically contingent. The tendency today is to demand recognition of past 
trauma or other adverse experience, and for the state, whether in the guise of 
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social worker or not, to validate the traumatic experience by conferring due 
recognition of the reality of suffering.
Such developments are of relevance to social policymakers and social workers as 
they work with many people who are indeed suffering and who do require 
validation. However, an awareness of the historical specificity of identity 
construction can allow an approach that does not see the person as a victim, but 
as someone who can, with appropriate conditions being met, overcome her 
difficulties and take control over her life. This could minimise the danger whereby 
the predominant identity recognised is that of the traumatised individual 
something which risks infantilising the individual and pathologising social 
problems.
The recognition debate also affects social workers in a more personal way, as 
they too seek recognition for the work they do. Again, as discussed, this has 
some positives, but it can also reinforce the divide between worker and client, 
and also downgrade the more macropolitical aspects of the social work role 
whereby social workers wield considerable power over the autonomy and liberty 
of individuals, negotiate the inherent tension between the public and private 
spheres and are responsible for the allocation of scarce resources to those in 
need. It may be that this negates the possibility of true mutual recognition 
between social workers and service users. Nevertheless, when warranted, 
challenging state power and the inadequacies of social welfare provision in such 
ways as to allow service user autonomy and control over their lives can go some 
way towards achieving such a goal.
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